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ABSTRACT: My purpose in this essay is to suggest, via case study, that if Anglo-American 
philosophy is to become more inclusive of non-western traditions, the discipline requires far 
greater efforts at self-scrutiny. I begin with the premise that Confucian ethical treatments of 
manners afford unique and distinctive arguments from which moral philosophy might profit, 
then seek to show why receptivity to these arguments will be low. I examine how ordinary 
good manners have largely fallen out of philosophical moral discourse in the west, looking 
specifically at three areas: conditions in the 18th and 19th centuries that depressed 
philosophical attention to manners; discourse conventions in contemporary philosophy that 
privilege modes of analysis not well fitted to close scrutiny of manners; and a philosophical 
culture that implicitly encourages indifference or even antipathy toward polite conduct. I 
argue that these three areas function in effect to render contemporary discourse inhospitable 
to greater inclusivity where Confucianism is concerned and thus, more broadly, that greater 
self-scrutiny regarding unexamined, parochial western commitments and practices is 
necessary for genuine inclusivity.	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There has of late been increasing attention in professional philosophy to the need to 
better include non-western philosophies in our discourse.1 Greater inclusivity is 
needed both pedagogically and intellectually, as the abiding narrowness of the 
discipline’s canon serves neither students nor the discipline itself. At least some of the 
difficulty in incorporating non-western philosophy into western-dominated discourses 
results from a kind of double bind. To gain inclusion, non-western philosophies need 
effectively to hook in to existing issues, interests, or paradigms in the dominant 
discourse; non-western philosophies need to offer something that addresses the  
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concerns and preoccupations western-trained philosophers find compelling and 
significant. However, where these philosophies do successfully hook in, this alone is 
rarely sufficient. Those scholars, for example, seeking to draw Buddhist no-self 
doctrines into contemporary discourses may be enjoined to explain just what Buddhist 
sources offer that Hume or Parfit do not already afford.2 Scholars working on virtue 
ethical interpretations of Confucian sources will need to demonstrate what the 
Confucians can philosophically accomplish that Aristotle cannot. Such is to say that 
even where non-western philosophical sources share common ground with western 
philosophies, that ground may yet be treated as fully occupied without them. They 
will simply seem surplus to requirements. Yet where non-western philosophies do 
indubitably deviate from what western-trained philosophers will find most familiar, 
where what they offer is transparently novel, this may generate resistance of a 
different order. For the more these philosophies appear to strike out into territories 
largely unexplored in western canonical sources or contemporary debates, the less 
“philosophical” they may seem to western-trained interlocutors. Failure to hook in to 
existing domains of inquiry or doing so in an unfamiliar style may awaken suspicion 
that here is something other than philosophy proper.3 The double bind for scholars 
who would promote interest in non-western traditions, then, can register as an 
importunate, impossible demand: Show us something we have not seen before, but be 
sure it looks well and truly familiar to us too. 
In this essay, I present a case study. In my judgment, one of the most significant 
contributions early Confucianism offers philosophical ethics is its close and acute 
attention to the deep moral significance of ordinary good manners and etiquette. The 
Confucians were deeply committed to li 禮 , here rendered as “manners” and 
“etiquette,”4 making it a defining feature in their accounts of virtue. This essay, 
however, is not about li and I will not forward arguments about how western-trained 
ethicists could profit from engagement with Confucian commendations of manners 
and etiquette. For those who are interested, there is already an embarrassment of 
riches in the existing literature.5 Rather than rehearse what is already widely available, 
I want instead to address why this literature might be neglected; rather than 
                                                
2 That Buddhist philosophers developed insights into the instability of conceptions of personal identity 
millennia ahead of their western counterparts is insufficient to awaken substantial attention. 
3 Dotson 2012 well-captures and analyzes this phenomenon and its effect on diversity in philosophy.  
4 Li, typically translated as “ritual,” most broadly encompasses traditional and conventional standards 
for conduct and comportment in recurrent social contexts. It governed high ceremony (e.g., funeral and 
memorial activity), conduct at court, and the myriad mundane activities of daily life, such as dining, 
greeting, receipt of gifts, and so forth. Those acquainted with contemporary work on polite standards 
will recognize a distinction between “etiquette” and “manners.” While the former refers to local and 
culturally contingent rules for polite intercourse, the latter refers to the broad, often cross-culturally 
shared values that underwrite particular rules. Confucian li incorporated both of these and so in what 
follows, I freely employ both terms. 
5 Many works could be listed here, but some notable works particularly focused on li include:  
Kupperman 2002; Wong 2008 and 2014; Lai 2006; Sarkissian 2010a and 2010b; Olberding 2009 and 
2015; and Stalnaker 2013.  
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articulating what western-trained philosophers ought to see of value in Confucian 
treatments of manners, I want instead to discuss why they are unlikely to see it.   
The Confucians’ energetic commitment to etiquette and manners will, I expect, 
seem strange to most western-trained ethicists. But this, I argue, has far less to do 
with peculiarities in Confucian philosophical commitments than with a lack of self-
awareness among western-trained philosophers regarding how their own idiosyncratic 
historical conditions, parochial discourse conventions, and professional culture inhibit 
appreciation of moral philosophy focused on manners and etiquette. This essay, then, 
is about these conditions, conventions, and culture, about the unacknowledged 
barriers to cultivating a more inclusive discipline that could welcome philosophy like 
that offered by the Confucians. To be clear, my argument is but a case study and thus 
necessarily limited in its scope. I only aspire to show why efforts to bring Confucian 
ethics to western-trained audiences are likely to fall on fallow ground.6 My critique is 
an effort to call attention to the fact that the soil itself needs amending if we are, 
minimally, to better incorporate non-western philosophies into the discipline and, 
maximally, to profit intellectually and philosophically from such efforts.   
I hasten to acknowledge that my argument is fashioned in a somewhat polemical 
style. In explanation, I offer only a sense of exhaustion with supplication and a 
corresponding urge to critique. A ready abundance of work well attesting to the value 
of non-western philosophies has, from my vantage, been insufficient to win robust 
inclusion of these philosophies in the discipline.7 Moreover, I confess to personal 
exasperation with the way occasional efforts to bring non-western philosophy to 
wider attention too often transpire. However well motivated, these often simply 
reinforce the existing hierarchy, with the unfamiliar weighed and evaluated relative to 
how well it conforms to existing expectations and preoccupations. It is not, for 
example, uncommon in fora where “east meets west,” where efforts are made to bring 
Confucianism to the attention of scholars trained exclusively in western philosophy, 
to hear remarks that include prefaces such as: “What would make Confucianism more 
appealing…” or “What would make Confucianism work…” What follows such 
prefaces are typically recommendations that Confucianism sacrifice whatever is 
perceived as alien, regardless of how significant it may be for Confucianism itself.  
The most pronounced version of this I have encountered was a designated “western” 
philosophical respondent to a panel of papers on li, or etiquette, who summarily 
announced that Confucianism would be “better” were it to “drop the whole li thing.” 
Quite apart from its incurious hubris, this remark is akin to suggesting Kant would be 
                                                
6 To be clear, the practices of li, or good manners, are so centrally important in Confucian ethics that 
exclusion of this element in what they offer is functionally and effectively to exclude Confucian ethics 
altogether from our discourse. 
7 E.g., by Brian Bruya’s recent accounting, there are only eight Ph.D.-granting philosophy departments 
in the United States that include a specialist in Chinese philosophy among their faculty, a number that 
reflects the slim opportunities for students seeking to specialize, but more potently indicates how rare it 
will be that any philosophers will enjoy exposure to Chinese philosophy during their graduate study.  
For more on this data and additional reflections on the state of the field for Chinese philosophy, see 
Bruya forthcoming. It also bears emphasizing that among the non-western philosophical traditions, 
Chinese philosophy is the best represented in the discipline. 
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acceptable if only he would not carry on so about reason. More broadly, one need 
only review the contents of the discipline’s ostensibly generalist subject journals – 
those devoted, for example, to ethics or to history – to see that receptivity to non-
western philosophies remains low.8 Likewise, discussions of whether or how non-
western philosophies should be included in the discipline too often pattern along the 
double bind described above, scrutinizing what these philosophies could possibly 
offer to conversations already underway without them. At least part of what these 
philosophies afford, I contend, is a way to recognize provincial idiosyncrasies in 
philosophical interests and practices, as well as the lacunae they may produce in 
western efforts to address the human condition or seek truth. The target of my case 
study–Confucian etiquette and manners–is, I think, but one such gap in contemporary 
ethics.9 
   My argument proceeds in four parts. I first provide a brief historical sketch of 
how manners and etiquette are positioned in western philosophical discourse. I then 
turn to discourse conventions prevalent in contemporary philosophical ethics, with 
the aim of showing how these appear generally uncongenial to study of manners.  
Third, I address the ways professional philosophy in the Anglo-American west may, 
as a sociological and cultural domain, incline practitioners away from serious 
philosophical interest in manners. I conclude by gesturing at how these features of 
western philosophical tradition and practice render it ill-suited for entertaining 
Confucian ethics.   
 
1. MANNERS AND WESTERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
As Judith Martin and Gunther Ghent observe, “Contemporary philosophers are 
largely innocent of etiquette” (Martin and Ghent 2001, 237). They have largely 
eschewed treating good manners as morally significant and indeed perhaps disdain 
etiquette as little more than “silly rules” (Martin and Ghent 2001, 238). However, we 
do well to recognize that even where western philosophy is concerned, this has not 
always been so: Aristotle remarks on the pleasing gait and voice timbre of the 
magnanimous person (Aristotle 1984, IV.3); both Seneca and Cicero actively instruct 
learners on the intersection of conventional good manners and the development of 
virtuous character;10 Hume closely observes the decorum in operation between host 
and guest, as well as writing extensively about sociability and good taste (Hume 1989, 
VIII.211); and Kant proffers rather elaborate recommendations regarding optimal 
                                                
8 E.g., in the 2010-2014 period included in the Philosopher’s Index, of the 276 articles published on 
Confucianism, almost all appeared in specialist journals devoted to non-western philosophy. During 
this period, fewer than ten such articles appeared in the most highly ranked general ethics journals.  
The situation in journals devoted to the history of philosophy is even worse, with most appearing to 
treat “history of philosophy” as synonymous with history of western philosophy.   
9 I will not speak for philosophies outside my own specialty, but other obvious areas in which 
Confucianism excels in attending to subjects largely neglected in contemporary western philosophy 
include the ethics of family and relational identities, ethics of emotions, elder care, and the 
philosophical and ethical challenges of bereavement. 
10 For a study of both Cicero’s and Seneca’s remarks on decorum, see Sherman 2005. 
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dinner party arrangements (Kant 2006, 179ff).11 Not caring about manners is, in 
western moral philosophy, of recent vintage. 
Scholars often mark the break between western moral philosophy and manners as 
transpiring in the 18th century and see the appearance of Lord Chesterfield’s Letters to 
his Son as a signal provocation for the breach.12 While Chesterfield’s Letters do not 
warrant the moral scorn they generated,13 because they were motivated in part by the 
desire to advise his son on strategies for socially ascending into “good company,” 
they were decried. Chesterfield’s Letters appeared to render explicit what many often 
suspected:  Being socially pleasing could operate as a simulacrum of morality, a way 
to seductively engineer the good opinion of others and thereby gain social advantage.  
Samuel Johnson’s biting response to the work–that it taught “the morals of a whore, 
and the manners of a dancing-master” (qtd. in Boswell 1953, 188)–vividly captures 
the suspicion into which polite social pleasantry of Chesterfield’s sort was cast. 
Although sale of Chesterfield’s Letters was brisk and interest in what he offered high 
among some, its popularity was seen by many in the intelligentsia as a scourge. 
In some quarters, increasing disdain for the distorting and pernicious artifice of 
manners inspired a desire to recover purportedly more natural modes of conduct and 
praise for the “rustic.” Rousseau provides an example of this. While not dismissing 
the worth of human companionship and community, Rousseau professes “distaste for 
the forms of human contact” both privileged and enforced in his time (Trachtenberg 
2008, 211). Like Chesterfield’s critics, Rousseau remarks upon the corrosive artifice 
and sly fakery of decorous norms, their capacity to render each opaque to each: 
 
Before art had fashioned our manners and taught our passions to speak a borrowed 
language, our morals were rustic but natural, and differences in conduct announced those 
of character at first glance. Human nature, at bottom, was not better. But men found their 
security in the ease of seeing through one another, and that advantage, of which we no 
longer sense the value, spared them many vices (Rousseau 2012, 13).  
 
In supplanting the natural, Rousseau averred, the ornamentation of conduct required 
by polite society also actively stifled individuation in favor of bovine conformity:  
One must follow custom, “but never one’s own genius,” acting always within the 
circumscribed constraints of “that herd called society” (Rousseau 2012, 13). The 
strictures of decorous convention thus ensured that one could neither be oneself nor 
well know others, for all would be concealed behind the “uniform and deceitful veil 
of civility” (Rousseau 2012, 13).  The rustic here features, in contrast, as refreshingly 
                                                
11 For a rich taxonomy describing how Kant links dinner parties to moral sensibility, see Cohen 2008. 
12 See, e.g., Curtin 1985, 396ff.; Arditi 1994, 180-182; and Hamann 2000, 92-94. Chesterfield’s Letters, 
written as counsel for his son and published posthumously in 1774, provide an ambitious compendium 
of the social mores of his day. Their instruction ranges from remarks on banal social practices to 
broader reflections on companionability. 
13 As Karen Stohr suggests, part of Chesterfield’s reasonable interest in his son’s decorous conduct is 
that “good manners make moral conduct more effective” (Stohr 2011, 16). Notably, Kant appears to 
draw inspiration for his reflection on dinner parties from Chesterfield (Kant 2006, 179). 
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raw and transparent, authentically free from the distortions of enforced sameness and 
sociable opacity.   
As Rousseau’s remarks on the stifling of the individual intimate, embedded in 
skepticism about etiquette was an increased appreciation of individual autonomy, and 
this too would weaken any presumption that manners and morality are readily or 
comfortably joined. Influential philosophical work emphasized the individual’s 
rational moral judgment as singularly authoritative. For example, Kant’s insistence on 
the unparalleled importance of autonomy in moral agency entailed that “each person 
has a compass that enables ‘common human reason’ to tell what is consistent with 
duty and what inconsistent” (Schneewind 1998, 515). As Julia Driver observes, one 
effect of this was to disassociate morality from obedience: “On the new view, 
obedience to moral authority is obedience to the self” (Driver 2006, 621). While 
Driver focuses on declining trust in moral expertise, just as emphasizing individual 
autonomy depreciated deference to moral expertise, so too it undermined the 
authority of custom and convention, the stuff of good manners. The common wisdom, 
tradition, and shared practice that make up etiquette would be subordinate to rational 
autonomous judgment. Such judgment could, to be sure, assent to the practices of 
etiquette, but this would occur through the agent’s own legislative powers rather than 
any reflexive or assumed expectation that one ought conform.14  
 Affirmative intellectual movements to prize natural authenticity and moral 
autonomy provided some reasoned basis for declining philosophical interest in 
manners. However, no account of this shift is complete absent attention to how 
interest in etiquette actively swelled in other quarters, largely as a result of changing 
economic conditions and the unprecedented social mobility they enabled. During the 
18th and 19th centuries, traditional class structures were destabilized as never before, 
creating incentives for those seeking to move up the social ladder to adopt the 
manners of their “betters.” Achieving command of etiquette practices was a way for 
those enjoying new economic prosperity to cultivate corresponding social capital. In 
particular, expansion of the numbers of women with leisure in the later part of this 
period gave rise to a publishing boom in etiquette manuals aimed at women newly 
able to assist in their families’ social improvement through entertaining and hosting.  
As this new audience for social instruction emerged, with its interest in mastering the 
                                                
14 While I cannot assay the distinction here, I suspect that reliance on self-legislation by autonomous 
individual agents fundamentally misses important features of social practices and establishes a 
somewhat troubling hierarchy in which individual judgment always trumps social wisdom. To be sure, 
as I discuss later, independent judgments regarding social practices can be valuable routes to revising 
morally pernicious practices. Still, exclusively framing adherence to etiquette as a matter of individual 
decision evokes concerns. Some of these are deep concerns such as whether shared practice is 
meaningful in a world of lone agents, each deciding the terms of her own membership and sociality. 
Others attach to aspects of moral learning, such as whether we endorse a rather thoroughgoing hubris 
by vesting all authority in the individual. The worry in the latter case is that deciding for oneself that 
shared practice is wrong–shared practice representing the cumulative wisdom of generations of others–
requires great caution. This concern manifests in Confucian accounts, where considerable humility 
about one’s own perspective is seen as the more prudent and morally responsible default position. 
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“higher” social arts, the literature itself correspondingly shifted.15 Where commentary 
on character and virtue accompanied earlier models of the form, etiquette writing, 
now aimed principally at women, instead emphasized intricacies of formal rules and 
norms.  Instruction on social virtue aimed at fitting readers for civic life was simply 
surplus to requirements given the abiding constraints of women’s lives: “women were 
not active in the world and hence did not require instruction in worldly things in their 
books of manners” (Curtin 1985, 419). As audience and genre shifted, concern with 
etiquette became emphatically feminized, a preoccupation of “ladies,” and etiquette 
instruction came to be derided as a “despised and trivial genre” (Curtin 1985, 418). 
Writing on etiquette increased apace, but it largely lost both audience and 
respectability among the intelligentsia.  
This necessarily brief rehearsal of historical and sociological elements in 
removing etiquette from western moral philosophy surely elides many complexities, 
but my most immediate purpose is to note that there was a removal. Where manners 
and morality had been joined in western philosophical discourse, they came apart and 
they have, with few exceptions, remained apart.16 The historical reasons for this 
should worry us. The more active arguments against attention to manners, such as 
Rousseau’s, hardly seem decisive for repudiating philosophical interest in manners.  
Prizing of the purportedly “rustic” and “natural” is itself prey to considerable 
suspicion, most commonly featuring as it does not among the “rustic” themselves but 
those enjoying sufficient social and economic privilege to romanticize it. The subject 
of individual autonomy has indubitably exercised a profound influence over 
developments in moral philosophy since Kant, but this too seems insufficient grounds 
for neglecting manners. Kant’s own occasional close preoccupation with matters of 
etiquette suggests that no inevitable disconnection from etiquette must accompany 
serious attention to moral autonomy. Quite the contrary, insofar as etiquette practices 
operate as symbolic expressions of respect, a focus on autonomy and attendant 
notions of human dignity may enhance incentives to treat etiquette seriously.17 Most 
worrisome, that the decline of serious philosophical attention corresponds to shifting 
sociological conditions–conditions that rendered those most interested in etiquette 
just those least likely to enjoy influence in philosophical discourse, women and eager 
aspirants from the lower classes–should give us pause. That the privileged men who 
have historically populated philosophy’s ranks abandoned etiquette just as the “lower 
orders” and women embraced it as empowering should, minimally, inaugurate 
misgivings about just why manners dropped from philosophical view. 
These historical considerations suggest that we do well to hold in some suspicion 
recent philosophical neglect of the moral seriousness of good manners. However 
strange Confucian accounts of etiquette may appear to contemporary philosophical 
interlocutors, it may be we, not the Confucians, who are the oddities, our unconcern 
                                                
15 As Curtin argues, the courtesy book genre which preceded the etiquette manual regularly, and as a 
matter of course, blended instruction in etiquette with reflection on moral virtues (Curtin 1985, 395-
397). 
16 Notable recent exceptions to this include Buss 1999; Sherman 2005; and Stohr 2006 and 2011. 
17 Buss 1999 provides a compelling argument to this effect. 
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with the moral dimensions of manners something many of the west’s own 
philosophical forebears would have found puzzling. In addition to reflecting on the 
historical and sociological conditions under which etiquette lost favor in western 
moral philosophy, it is also important to acknowledge that contemporary western 
moral philosophy often operates under discourse conditions that ill fit it for 
consideration of etiquette.   
 
2. ETIQUETTE AND CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL  
DISCOURSE CONDITIONS 
 
There is of course no uniform style of discourse that singularly marks contemporary 
philosophy. Nonetheless, there may yet be considerable implicit expectations 
regarding what good philosophy should accomplish. Among these expectations, the 
one most relevant to acknowledge in relation to moral accounts of manners is the 
priority we assign to developing arguments that are, as best we can make them, 
unassailable. While no argument succeeds in this, the expectation that we should 
nonetheless try inevitably influences the conditions under which discourse proceeds 
and indeed the terrain it will explore. Both how we talk and what we talk about may 
be constrained by estimations we make about the prospects for results that will be 
secure from ready challenge. 
 Seeking arguments that can withstand energetic critical scrutiny will, perhaps 
inevitably, direct attention toward just those regions within an argument’s domain 
that seem most perilous, most liable to afford cover from which the critic may pounce. 
More generally, meeting hazards well can operate to display an argument’s mettle.  In 
contemporary philosophical ethics, this frequently takes the form of entertaining 
dramatic tensions between compelling, competing values or cases of moral conflict. 
Discourse often privileges for special attention hard cases that most test what an 
argument will entail and thus require its advocates to accept.18 Much attention is 
thereby directed toward cases where conflict is drawn to crisis, where competing 
values vie for dominance, and where there appears no good way out. Generally 
reliable rules are pressed into service to address the unusual circumstance that will 
ostensibly illuminate exceptions or expose the rule’s vulnerability to problematically 
counterintuitive entailments. Fat men wedged in cave openings and imperiling their 
companions thus aid us in considering that troubling moral issue: When may I 
deliberately kill?  Even where more commonplace aspects of moral experience are the 
target, the exceptional tends to prevail. Thus while we all must sometimes entertain 
whether to be truthful, it is to whether we must be so to murderers seeking those 
concealed in our basements that philosophy closely attends: “May I lie now?” we ask.  
The relatively thin contemporary literature on manners similarly inclines toward 
                                                
18 To be clear, I do not suggest that this is the only function hard cases serve. Pressing at these can, to 
be sure, illuminate otherwise opaque or unrecognized features of a moral theory. The trouble I identify, 
and address more later, occurs where preoccupation with hard cases functionally ever postpones 
fulsome examination of whatever more generally sound and compelling insight a moral view might 
offer.   
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tensions and conflict, toward assaying the perils we court when we enjoin people to 
be polite.   
The most basic form of the “hard case” in discourse about manners stems from 
commitments to autonomy, the perception that injunctions to abide by polite 
convention discourage the exercise of moral autonomy by supplanting individual 
moral judgment with conformity to imperfect social norms. Cheshire Calhoun 
registers this tension with reference to what she characterizes as a “socially critical 
moral point of view:”   
 
When one adopts a socially critical moral point of view, one does not try to determine 
how people ought to be treated by investigating how they are treated, or how social 
conventions recommend they should be treated, or any other social fact of this kind. 
Instead, adopting a socially critical moral point of view means adopting a standpoint that 
enables one to evaluate the moral merit of established social norms and to recommend the 
moral principles that, ideally, would be embodied in our social norms. Adopting a 
socially critical moral point of view means being prepared to violate existing social 
conventions (Calhoun 2000, 252).  
 
Strong advocacy of etiquette sits uneasily with valuing a socially critical moral point 
of view. We need not look far to find cases that illuminate tensions between what 
etiquette would require and what conscience can dictate: Need I shake hands with 
persons I find morally repugnant? Must I respond politely to socially acceptable 
gestures I judge to reinforce pernicious hierarchies? The general challenge here is 
whether I must treat conventional rules as binding when those rules defy my own 
considered moral judgments: In a contest between good manners and good moral 
conscience, what wins?   
 A related form of this concern often refracts through discourse regarding 
etiquette’s social function.  Enjoining adherence to contingent etiquette norms can 
register as a threat to social progress.  For in suppressing exercises of conscience, 
etiquette suppresses dissent from the status quo that can helpfully challenge unjust or 
morally pernicious practices.  In Sarah Buss’ idiom, codes of manners, though they be 
widely accepted and broadly endorsed, can nonetheless be “codes of bad manners” 
(Buss 1999, 810). Rudimentary acquaintance with history assures us that our 
ancestors participated in practices we now consider morally wrong. Such practices 
change, when they do, where social consensus shifts, where what has heretofore been 
acceptable yields to more just practice. Rudeness and incivility can be the 
importunate rebels with a cause, with breaches of socially defined “good behavior” 
stimulating morally important revisions of shared conventions.  Shifting conventional 
social norms is often important to moral progress, but the deeper our commitment to 
our contingent social practices, the less agile will be such shifts, the more belated our 
revisions of pernicious norms. 
Concerns about conscience and social dissent enjoy most prominence in 
contemporary treatments of etiquette, I suspect, because it is here that we find our 
most familiar mechanisms for testing the worth of ideas: cases that challenge, conflict 
carried to crisis, and tension between competing values we must seek to resolve. The 
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moral importance of etiquette, we risk suggesting, must be judged by how we answer 
the question: When may I be rude? Clearly this question is morally important. 
Nevertheless, it is problematic where it summons the lion’s share of attention. Most 
fundamentally, the question already presupposes a model of moral conduct at odds 
with how manners typically work. Behaving politely will most often and in most 
circumstances not issue from self-conscious choice and decision, but out of acquired 
habits in speech, conduct, and demeanor. One may of course select what habits one 
will cultivate, but even here, more often one’s habits will result from accession to 
conventional practices widely recognized and practiced in one’s community. So too, 
rudeness will more often result from poor habituation, inattention, or competing 
claims on finite energies than from deliberate, purposeful rule-breaking. Such is to 
say that manners may not be a moral territory that can be well-mapped with the tools 
most often employed in contemporary discourse. More basically, to the extent that 
contemporary philosophical practice inclines us to hasten to locate the most perilous 
areas within an argument’s domain, it may suppress exploration of manners 
altogether. For manners may well be, and indeed I expect they are, a terrain with an 
overabundance of perils. They are, in other words, endlessly and ever assailable. 
Comprised of contingent and culturally peculiar custom, originating in fallible and 
imperfect tradition, manners will always and persistently present problems. To the 
extent, then, that contemporary expectations of philosophical discourse direct effort 
and attention toward unassailable conclusions, it will depress attention to the practices 
of good manners. 
I hasten to acknowledge that there are of course theoretical approaches available 
in contemporary western moral philosophy that steer away from preoccupation with 
dramatic tensions and cases, most notably virtue ethics and care ethics, both of which 
scholars have argued share important resemblances to early Confucianism.19 However, 
although these moral theories appear more immediately congenial to addressing 
manners, neither undertakes the close and sustained attention to polite practices seen 
in Confucianism. That is, even while many contemporary ethicists do self-
consciously incline away from preoccupation with hard cases, this has not yet 
inclined them toward close attention to manners. The reasons for this are surely 
several, but the comparably few works on manners found in contemporary 
scholarship indicate one:  perceptions regarding what philosophers care about.    
  Strikingly, where contemporary ethicists speak to manners, they often inaugurate 
discussion with apologetics pitched to anticipate and answer the charge that their 
subject simply does not warrant philosophical attention. More basically, they appear 
to assume that their fellow philosophers may pre-emptively refuse to follow them on 
excursions into manners. For example, Buss observes, “Many philosophers, however, 
seem to take it for granted that manners lie outside the scope of morality. They 
assume that doing one’s moral duty is one thing, being polite quite another” (Buss 
1999, 796). Nancy Sherman more emphatically sounds a similar note:  “Philosophers 
                                                
19 For treatment of Confucianism and virtue ethics, see, e.g., Slingerland 2001; Van Norden 2007; Yu 
2007. For Confucianism and care ethics, see Li 2000 and Rosenlee 2006. 
 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 6.2 (2015)  OLBERDING 
24 
have been quick to dismiss manners and comportment as optional trim on moral 
character, and in some cases, as mere priggish conventions that have little bearing on 
genuine virtue” (Sherman 2005, 60). And, in work on civility, Calhoun identifies 
“intimate associations with etiquette or good manners” as one of “three strikes” 
against considering civility a virtue (Calhoun 2000, 251). Similar observations feature 
where ethicists undertake close study of virtues that, by their nature, inevitably 
incorporate performance of etiquette practices.  In work on agreeableness, Kristján 
Kristjánsson notes, “Many philosophers would complain that such dallying with 
demeanor and niceties lacks any real moral ballast” (Kristjánsson 2006, 36). Writing 
about tact, David Heyd concedes that tact “at first sight seems quite marginal and of 
little philosophical interest” (Heyd 2008, 218). In sum, readers interested in 
philosophical treatments of manners quickly learn that a discourse convention of this 
literature is to acknowledge that taking manners seriously is a venture undertaken in 
defiance of what most philosophers will count important. There is, I think, much that 
is correct in these ethicists’ perceptions about the interests of their peers, but this 
simply invites us to ask why this would be so. 
 
3. PHILOSOPHY AND THE ICONOCLAST POSE 
 
That contemporary western-trained philosophers might doubt the philosophical bona 
fides of etiquette is likely explained in part by the historical conditions I briefly 
canvass above. Such doubts, however, also find support in the informal ways in 
which the philosopher’s social identity is currently constructed. Such is to say that 
estimations of what counts as “philosophically interesting and important” may well 
have sociological features. I have argued elsewhere that the social identity of the 
philosopher is currently constructed in ways at odds with good manners (Olberding 
2014). Let me briefly reprise this argument as it bears on receptivity to treating 
etiquette and manners as “philosophically interesting.” 
In his work on social self-presentation, Erving Goffman argues that professions 
tend to forward a group social identity by implicitly encouraging members “to 
incorporate and exemplify the officially accredited values of the society” (Goffman 
1959, 35). A social group is meaningfully constituted by its members’ accession to a 
body of shared values.  To be in the group is to endorse its values, but also, and 
significantly, to signal this endorsement in one’s behavior and comportment.  The 
group thus constitutes itself as group in part through the development of a recognized 
symbolic “pose,” external markers of membership that may include characteristic, 
identity signaling modes of speech, interaction, comportment, or even dress. 20  
Signaling one’s membership to others transpires both from intellectually acceding to 
shared group values and from enacting what symbolically signals those values in 
                                                
20 That philosophers do have such an externalized, visible pose is, I think, often evident at conferences, 
where one can sit in a hotel lobby or bar and make sport by trying to identify which of those passing by 
are philosophers. Indeed, I have overheard philosophers at conferences doing just this, using cues 
offered by dress, physical demeanor, and modes of speech to spot others of “their kind” in a mixed 
social space. 
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one’s social self-presentation.21  The profession of philosophy, I suggest, often 
inclines toward forwarding a social identity and pose for philosophers that implicitly 
pitches itself against caring about ordinary good manners. Both how philosophy itself 
is characterized and the symbolic social behaviors that attend this characterization are 
such as to reduce receptivity to taking manners seriously.   
The “officially accredited values” of philosophy–those values that distinctly mark 
philosophers out as members of a shared intellectual and social guild–are perhaps 
most often characterized by philosophers themselves as having no “officially 
accredited values.” Efforts to describe what philosophy is and thus what philosophers 
do often emphasize its critical spirit and, correspondingly, the intellectual 
independence of the philosopher, his ability to stand free of the unexamined 
conventions and commitments by which others operate.22 Moreover, because he does 
stand free, he uniquely welcomes plain speaking–the better to get at truth–and cares 
little for decorous pleasantry or unnecessary, muddy indirection. While I think this 
version of the philosopher’s social identity is of recent vintage, it seems to derive 
some of its power by drawing on characterizations of western philosophy’s 
originating exemplar. 
Socrates looms large as western philosophy’s first and most potent exemplar.  He 
challenges those in power, ostensibly indifferent to the personal costs he thereby 
incurs, and explicitly disavows concern with the preoccupations of ordinary people. 
He openly defies and sometimes mockingly skewers the unreflective, unexamined 
“truths” by which others operate. He speaks truth to power and cares not about any 
offense he may thereby provoke, for he is valiantly unbound by the opinions of others 
or by social convention. He doesn’t even wear shoes! This is of course an unsubtle, 
ham-fisted sketch of Socrates, but it is one that simplifies into romantic heroic form a 
figure under whose influence western philosophers have long labored. And shades of 
just this ham-fisted figure frequently feature in how contemporary philosophers 
describe their own activities and indeed the persona philosophy purportedly requires. 
As Robert Solomon observes, philosophy entails a happy willingness to enact “a 
profound kind of freedom” ungoverned by the preoccupations and expectations of 
wider society (Solomon 2003, 7). Graham Priest’s account of philosophy is perhaps 
most fulsome in characterizing this freedom. Priest argues that philosophy is 
essentially “subversive” and that, for the philosopher, “there is nothing that is 
sacrosanct, no criticism that is beyond the pale” (Priest 2006, 201). Although there is 
surely some justice in this characterization of philosophy’s intellectual orientation, it 
also clearly sometimes operates as a social pose in the sense that Goffman limns, a 
way of marking out the philosopher from others, a mechanism by which philosophers 
assert and legitimate a shared identity. This is most evident in how philosophers 
                                                
21 To be clear, the phenomenon Goffman describes most often transpires below conscious awareness, 
with members of a group replicating the social pose of the group absent any substantial awareness that 
they are doing so.    
22 I here employ male pronouns for philosophers advisedly, as I suspect that the male skew in the 
demographic profile of philosophy may be encouraged by the pose I here describe. An argument to 
that effect is offered in Olberding 2014. 
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sometimes valorize their purportedly radical freedom in order to distinguish 
themselves from other academics.  Priest, for example, identifies the bold willingness 
to question anything as the distinguishing trait of the philosopher.  Members of other 
disciplines – he cites science, religion, and history as examples – are not “allowed to 
question” so freely (Priest 2006, 201). The force of this as pose is evident if we press 
a bit at the comparison to other disciplines.  
It seems to me debatable whether other disciplines do indubitably possess 
unchallenged or unexamined commitments, at least in any sense meaningful for 
readily distinguishing philosophy from other disciplines.23 Historians do not, to be 
sure, query whether “other historians have minds” (Priest 2006, 201), but there is a 
considerable gap between historians’ failure to query this and their having significant, 
“sacrosanct” commitments they decline to examine.24 More directly, no reader of 
contemporary scholarship in history is likely to conclude that historians 
systematically fail to achieve the features Priest associates uniquely with philosophy:  
Historians too “challenge things which everybody else takes for granted, or whose 
rejection most people do not countenance;” studying history is, for many American 
students at least, deeply “unsettling” and can leave learners feeling “that they have 
had the rug pulled out from under them;” and historians do seem to perform work of 
“universal import,” if we include in this the significance of developing historical 
sensibilities about human institutions and the human condition (Priest 2006, 202-203).  
The only feature Priest associates with philosophy that historians clearly fail to fulfill 
is telling: “philosophers make a habit in seminars and conferences of attacking the 
views put forward by the speaker, in a way that would be considered unseemly in 
other disciplines” (Priest 2006, 203n.9). That is, philosophers behave in ways others 
find rude.   
Philosophy’s ostensible commitment to free inquiry produces a pose and 
discourse style unbound by the polite conventions on which others operate. This is 
evident in how philosophers describe their work, their proclivity for employing 
agonistic metaphors to capture philosophical activity, metaphors ranging from the 
ubiquitous “attack” to those suggestive of cowboys at the OK Corral, such as Priest’s 
claim that philosophers have always “shot at religions, political systems, and public 
mores” (Priest 2006, 202), or Solomon’s regretful observation of philosophy’s 
“gunslinger” discourse style (Solomon 2003, 9), or the “argument as combat” model 
incisively critiqued by Helen Beebee (Beebee 2013, 66).25 Indeed, philosophy’s 
                                                
23 More debatable still is whether philosophers enjoy an epistemic vantage from which such a 
conclusion could be securely reached. 
24 I do not take it as prima facie evident that sacrosanct commitments are implicitly endorsed wherever 
a discipline fails to address some question, much less a question not clearly within its traditional 
disciplinary purview. Moreover, a historian might well charge philosophy with having a “sacrosanct” 
commitment to its own purportedly ahistorical freedom for its persistent failures to query the historical 
contingencies influencing the trajectories of inquiry it has pursued. 
25 One obstacle to developing more congenial conversational models is, as Beebee compellingly argues, 
an inability or unwillingness to separate critical content from aggressive style. As she observes, the 
former can well exist without the latter, though they are too frequently taken as synonymous in 
discussions of philosophical interactional style.  
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discourse practices are such that critics of this style are left to issue reminders that 
“philosophy isn't Fight Club” and explicitly request pedestrian polite standards 
(Chalmers undated).  For it is no given that philosophers know better than to roll their 
eyes, “make faces,” and act “incredulous” when entertaining each others’ work 
(Chalmers undated). While Beebee and Chalmers represent a countertrend to 
agonistic discourse style, in the contest between civility and combat, combat appears 
to be winning.26  To be sure, this at least does distinguish us from the historians.27   
Where we take measure of how the social identity and pose of the philosopher is 
currently constructed, it seems, at least to me, that the much-vaunted critical spirit of 
philosophy is insufficiently critical of its own conceits. There are considerable 
existential perils here. There may be no firmer chains than the mistaken, confident 
conviction that one is uniquely free. So too, there is considerable bathos in believing 
oneself like Socrates while being merely and rather prosaically rude. These perils are 
significant and we should be unhappily wary when characterizations of our distinctive 
work reduce to our practicing styles of interactions others find unpleasant. However, 
my interest is in registering these issues as a way to capture why finding manners 
“philosophically interesting” is at odds with a persona too often actively and 
explicitly cultivated in professional philosophy.   
  In its most egregious forms, the philosopher’s pose leads to blunt valorization of 
a rather juvenile rebellious spirit out of which a philosopher should: 
 
taunt the prudish and prim, ridicule the conventional and boring, outrage the pious and 
conformist. The cultural tradition that falls under this description sees itself as in favor of 
art, freedom, creativity, spontaneity, playfulness, life, and experience; it casts itself as 
standing against stifling social norms and dull conformity. It is given to provocation, 
controversy, and shock tactics. Accordingly, it is often pilloried and persecuted, and of 
course misunderstood. It does not see itself as against morality as such, but it does view 
conventional pieties with a beady and skeptical eye. It is on the lookout for hypocrisy, 
dogma, intolerance, suppression, and sheer dullness of spirit (McGinn 2013). 
                                                
26 In my view, efforts to promote more genial modes of interaction in the discipline have been 
damaged by the harsh responses these efforts too often receive. We seem to have achieved exquisite 
nadir in the profession when taking a pledge to be professionally civil is construed as the opening bell 
on a pugilistic cagematch (See Schmidt 2014). That many philosophers resist this has not yet been 
enough to substantially alter the profession’s problematic climate. It is of course possible that the heat 
surrounding calls for greater civility issues in part from just the social identity issues I assay above.  
Insofar as philosophers define their distinctive identity by extolling agonism as “our way,” reduction of 
the discipline’s pugilism may register as an existential threat. Beebee intimates something like this, as 
she notes that arguments indicating that women may dislike the discipline’s aggressive style are 
sometimes received as insulting to women–that is, philosophy is so identified with this style that to not 
like it is tantamount to not liking, or being capable in, philosophy. See Beebee 2013. 
27 While I do not make this argument explicitly, this proclivity for identifying philosophical activity 
with a merciless, agonistic discourse style likely promotes the imperative to seek the unassailable:  
Where one knows that one’s interlocutors will “pull no punches” in forwarding critique, venturing into 
the assailable will seem unappealing. Put more plainly, the purportedly “unbound” discourse style of 
philosophy may yield much philosophy that is intellectually cramped and constricted by the defensive 
crouch gunslinging renders safest. 
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Reflections such as this not only dismiss the stuff of convention infusing manners, 
they actively promote enmity toward it and contempt for those who might care about 
it. I cannot surmise how widely shared this more extreme view of philosophical 
activity is among philosophers, but we do well to recognize the continuum between 
more benign expressions of the philosopher’s “unique freedom” and a more 
ambitious, self-valorizing arrogance that imagines the philosopher ever pitched 
against an unthinking herd. Where prideful agonism and reflexive, incurious scorn for 
ordinary social norms enjoy some currency in how philosophers conceive themselves 
and their activity, serious philosophical discourse about manners will be suppressed.   
 It may of course be objected that even if the social identity of the philosopher 
promotes discourse styles that discard or even disdain conventional good manners, 
this need be no barrier to our taking a theoretical interest in manners; behavioral 
indifference to etiquette need not transmute into intellectual indifference.28 I am, 
however, skeptical that such a division is easily maintained.  Indeed, believing we can 
embrace an intellectual interest in politeness while practicing aggressive, rude styles 
of discourse strikes me as dreadfully naïve.29 For it appears but a refinement in the 
myth of our intellectual independence and freedom:  where ordinary mortals might 
find their customary habits and practices exercising an influence over their attitudes 
and interests, the philosopher is immune. More concretely, we ought not neglect the 
reality that philosophers are made, not born. They are produced in and by social-
intellectual atmospheres and, as Goffman argues, desire to secure a place within a 
social group amplifies incentives to appear well-fitted: The role-seeker will want to 
demonstrate a “sacred compatibility between the man and his job” (Goffman 1959, 
46). We thus should not expect philosophers developing their identities within a guild 
that practices disdain for ordinary mannerly conventions to intellectually embrace a 
domain so removed from the way their guild defines itself and structures its 
distinctive pose.30    
 
4. THE CONFUCIAN TERRITORY 
 
Where we acknowledge the limitations of western philosophy regarding manners and 
etiquette–its historical shifts, discourse conventions, and social identity–it is no 
wonder that a western philosopher encountering Confucianism should think it good to 
“drop the whole li thing.” Entertaining Confucianism as it is requires entertaining 
                                                
28 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for Comparative Philosophy for alerting me to this 
objection. 
29 It can of course also be objected that there is a parochial set of conventions in philosophy, 
conventions that, if not customarily polite, function to regulate and establish boundaries for interaction.  
I will not address this objection here, but have addressed it elsewhere in Olberding 2014, 300.  
30 While I am here not addressing Confucianism in substantive detail, it bears noting that were we 
more conversant with Confucianism, we would find a host of arguments that compellingly address the 
power of feedback loops between conduct and intellectual dispositions. Put more strongly, very few 
Confucians would be prey to just the naivete I identify here, nor would they hold truck with the idea 
that we can nurture young philosophers to behave one way and define their intellectual interests 
another. 
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much that is alien, and of the alien targets Confucianism offers for summary dismissal 
by western-trained philosophers, li qua etiquette looms largest. My purpose here, to 
reiterate, is not to rehearse Confucianism. Nonetheless, let me gesture briefly at 
characteristic elements in its reasoning about manners that are unlikely to find 
accommodating place in western-dominated philosophical discourse and practice. 
 I take it as rather a given that ordinary people do care about etiquette and manners.  
The reasons they care are ones any Confucian philosopher would find familiar. Our 
prosaic interactions and exchanges with others can exercise an outsized influence on 
moral well-being, affecting whether, for example, we believe ourselves respected, 
whether we can achieve fellow feeling and common purpose with others, whether we 
can cooperate toward shared ends and goods, and whether we steer away from 
morally corrosive misanthropy and social alienation. Out of reasons such as these, the 
Confucians count it a high philosophical priority to develop a sophisticated 
understanding of the link between trained, habitual polite behavior and robust moral 
goodness.  
 Perhaps most significantly, the Confucians treat being well-mannered as a way of 
life.  Rather than focusing on problem cases, they attend most to generally reliable yet 
defeasible guides for social conduct, what Hegel fatuously derided as the Confucian 
tendency to offer “nothing definite further than a commonplace moral put in the form 
of good, sound doctrine” (Hegel 1963, 120-121). In this, their aims include 
discovering what social practices and cultivated habits will most efficaciously fulfill 
goods such as those limned above – achieving fellow feeling, effective social 
cooperation, and avoiding misanthropic alienation. While recognizing that no 
practices or habits can cover all contingencies, they emphasize that much of what 
matters morally involves behavior and comportment operating beneath conscious 
awareness and cognitive processing. Thus the “problems” that summon their attention 
are not isolated situations involving a tension in values requiring deliberate resolution, 
but challenges concerning shared practices in necessarily imperfect communities, 
where learners will be subject to environmental shaping and the quality of moral 
atmosphere a community enjoys will owe much to what its members do reflexively 
and unthinkingly.31 Sussing out mechanisms by which circumspect reflection on deep 
values can be brought to bear on steering reflex is thus the principal “problem” to 
solve.   
The challenges identified by the Confucians entail that they tarry long in the 
assailable, focusing effort on capturing both how prosaic courtesy practices most 
typically work and what personal and social goods they characteristically, if not 
inevitably, produce. They consequently traverse territories that the contemporary 
haste to locate and avoid peril will rarely reach. The perils here remain many, but are 
courted in comprehension that not attending to the moral dynamics of banal social 
exchanges is the greater danger, for such will leave untouched and uncharted vast 
reaches of experience that source our moral attitudes, emotions, behaviors, and 
                                                
31 As I argue elsewhere, this is one reason that Confucian ethics should be of interest for those 
concerned with the moral aspects of micro-inequities. See Olberding forthcoming. 
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motivations. Confucianism does not, to be sure, dwell long on answering queries 
regarding when and whether I may be rude. However, this difference in focus may 
helpfully alert us to distortions produced where privileging such questions ever 
forestalls other inquiry, operating as if a precondition for entering any building is 
knowing first where the exits are and ensuring that they are explicitly marked.  
Moreover, there is a rational proportionality in the Confucian focus on the generally 
reliable yet defeasible, a sense that effort expended on the banal and unexceptional is 
well spent, for it is here that most lives transpire. And, to be sure, there are 
considerable challenges and difficulties in the unexceptional.   
The Confucian sensibility regarding manners comprehends that what we find 
difficult as moral actors is sometimes, and indeed perhaps most often, managing the 
unexceptional but unrelenting demands of ordinary life with others.  By simple dint of 
their humanity, others lay claim to our moral energies, requiring acknowledgement 
and sharing our communal space. How and whether we answer those claims will 
require much, so devising effective economies, such as those afforded by shared 
systems of etiquette, is crucial. Above all, they recognize that being polite–that is, 
being reliably respectful, considerate, and thoughtful in ways that morally profit 
others and community–is hard. This is in part why their originating exemplar, 
Confucius, may seem so strikingly different from our own. 
Confucius is admired and indeed valorized in his tradition for qualities at 
considerable odds with at least our most popular, ham-fisted versions of Socrates and, 
by extension, the social pose we encourage philosophers to adopt. Our Socrates is 
often presented as a mature version of the child who boldly announces that the 
emperor has no clothes: He stands ready to bluntly expose the conceits and self-
deceptions by which others operate. Confucius, I expect, would find it meaningful 
that the traditional version of “The Emperor’s New Clothes” features a child, 
someone, that is, untutored in recognizing the discomfort, shame, and damage where 
a person is deceived in his own insecurities into parading nude through the streets.  
The child is naïve, not brave, and mature courage comes in many more, and many 
more subtle forms than such a tale comprehends. More generally, Confucius is 
admired in his tradition not least because he is polite, because he gracefully meets the 
unrelenting challenges of ordinary life.  That he is polite is treated not as an incidental 
fact or feature of personality, but is instead one of the more significant reasons he is 
counted wise and exemplary. To be a philosopher, in this idiom, is to cultivate deep 
moral sensitivity to the subtleties of human interaction and the fragility of community 
constituted through them. 
There is much more that might be said, and indeed has been said, about just what 
is included in Confucianism’s ambitious excursions into ordinary good manners and 
moral goodness, but rehearsing this is beyond my remit. It suffices here to observe 
that there is much in the style, foci, and practice of early Confucianism that is 
unlikely to satisfy the expectations of those steeped in the history, discourse 
conventions, and professional culture I limn above. This is not, on my reckoning, a 
problem for Confucianism, but for philosophy as it is most often practiced in the 
contemporary west. That Confucianism may defy our expectations regarding what is 
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“philosophically interesting and important” is one potent reason to attend more 
closely to it and, by extension, to non-western traditions more generally.   
I have here only addressed obstacles that might inhibit the capacities of western-
trained philosophers to appreciate one aspect of one of the world’s non-western 
philosophical traditions. However, my more global purpose is to suggest, via this case 
study, that we modify the ways we in the profession assess efforts at greater 
inclusivity. Specialists have already produced a substantial body of work that can 
show why we should care about non-western traditions.  What we more urgently need 
in Anglo-American professional philosophy are far greater efforts at self-scrutiny, 
efforts to examine why we too often fail to care. Whether or not the western-
dominated profession of philosophy can become more inclusive and less indolently 
incurious about non-western traditions will now most depend on whether it can turn 
its oft-touted critical spirit on itself, whether it can scrutinize its own assumptions, 
expectations, and practices. Until this happens, efforts to win greater inclusion for 
non-western traditions will remain, to borrow phrasing from Mengzi, exercises in 
climbing trees to search for fish. I have only offered one case study, but I suggest that 
where we fail to find some substantively core and storied element of a non-western 
tradition “uninteresting,” it’s likely us not them. 
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